The authors explore the evolution of one cognitive mechanism required for altruistic behavior: the capacity to inhibit prepotent responses. Specifically, the authors used an object retrieval task to investigate whether capuchins (Cebus apella) can inhibit ii prepotent siraiegy of reaching directly for a food reward. Success in this task varies across species and across development, but is also known to depend critically on the maturity of dorsolateral prefrontal conex. ihe cortical area implicated in rejecting small payoffs in an Ultimatum Game. Capuchins easily inhibit the tendency LO reach directly for food in the object retrieval task, successfully employing an alternative reaching strategy even in the first session of performance. This contrasts with the performance of closely related tamarin monkeys, who pcrtormed less well despite extensive training. These results provide the lirst evidence that capuchins likely exhibit human-like inhibitory control in tasks previously linked to the function of the dorsolateral preirontal cortex, such as the Ultimatum Game.
A standard assumption in classical economics is that human decision makers should consistently prefer options that maximize their own expected payolTs. In contrast to this standard assumption of sell-interest, people regularly hehave in ways that require inhihiting the desire to behave in a purely self-interested way-^people volunteer for the military, donate blood, give money to charities, and so on. Humans also regularly violate their own self-interest to enforce similar fair behaviors in others, punishing those that act unfairly often at a substantial cost to themselves. In tbese and other examples, humans routinely provide striking examples of inhibitory control: we frequently are able to inhibit our own self-interest to behave both altruistically and in ways that uphold fairness norms (see Stevens & Häuser. 2 
(K)4).
Over the last few years, neuroscientists and other researchers have become interested in tbe neural mechanisms required to inhibit prepotent responses in tbe service of altruistic and social Venkai R. Lakstiminarayanan and Laurie R. Santos. Department of Psychology, Yale University, Correspondence concerning this anide should be addressed to Venkat Lakshminurayanan. Depannient of Psychology. Yale University. 2 Hillhouse Ave.. New Haven. CT 06.520 H mail: venkat.lakshtninarayanan@yate.edu norms. In one recent paper. Sanfey and colleagues (2003) used functional imaging techniques to investigate the neural systems underlying perftinnance on the Ullimatum Game, a one-shot game in which two anonymous players must decide how to split a cash offer. The first individual--the proposer-proposes a potential division of the offer. The second individualthe responder-then decides whether to accept or reject the proposed division. If the responder accepts the proposer's offer, then the money is split as proposed, but if the responder rejects the proposer's offer, then neither player earns any money. Sanfey and colleagues scanned participants during an Ultimatum Gatne and examined the systems that underlie responders' spiteful rejection behavior in this task. Curiously, a particular neural region involved in inhibitory control-the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)-was selectively recruited when responders distinguished between fair and unfair offers, suggesting that this region is needed to inhibit the prepotent self-interested urge tti accept the monetary reward. Testing this prediction more directly. Knoch and colleagues used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to disrupt DLPFC regions while rcspunders were evaluating fair and unfair offers (Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer. Treyer. & Fehr. 2006 ).
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They observed thai participants whose right DI.PFC regions were disrupted were substantially more likely to accept low offers than matched et>ntrols. Interestingly, these participants accepted low offers despite the fact that ihey evaluated ihese low offers as unfair (Knoch et al.. 2ÍK)6 ). These results suggest ihai DLPFCmedialed inhibitory control systems play a key role in our human-like capacity to inhibit selfish choices, particularly in the contexl of foregoing seU-inicresied payoffs in the service of altruistic acts.
At the same time that neuroscientists have begun unearthing ihe importance of inhibitory control systems in human altruistic behavior, comparative researchers have become interested the evolutionary origins of our capacity for self-control. This comparative work has focused on the broad question of whether other primate species share the human capacity lo lnhibii prepotent responses in a variety of contexts and experimental tasks. To date, this work has revealed a complicated pattern of performance. Most primates have tended to perform poorly on one general test of inhibitory control known as ihc reverse continf^ency task {see Russell, Mauthner. Sharpe, & Tidswell, 1991) . In ihis task, a suhiect is faced with a choice beIween either a large or a small ft)od reward. The suhject is then required to point to the smaller reward to obtain the larger one. to succeed at the lask. To do so, subjects musi inhibit ihe tendency to reach directly for Ihe larger reward. Chimpan/ees {Fan tro^loihtes) (Boysen & Bernston, 1995; Vlamings, Uher, & Call. 2006) and other primates (Kralik. Häuser, & Zimlicki, 2001 ; Silhcrherg & Fujita, 1996) have tended to perform extremely poorly on this kind of task, exeept in cases where symbols are used instead of food rewards {Boysen & Bernston. 1995). In contrast, another inhibitory control test-a discounting task in which subjects must forgo an immediate reward in favor of a larger delayed reward-has revealed an even more complicated pattern ot performance. Recenl work suggests that chinipan/xcs are willing to forgo an immediate small reward for a larger delayed reward even at very long delays (Beran, Savage-Rumhaugh. Pate, Rumbaugh, 1999: Beran, 2(M) More recently, comparative researchers have begun examining the nature of primates" inhihitory capacities in the more specilic contexl of S(x;ial decision making, namely contexts much like the ones in which humans tend to altruistically forego their own self-interest. This work to date has focused mostly on iwo model priniale species-ihe chimpanzee and the brown capuchin monkey, Both species possess relatively large brains, live in complicated social groups, and exhibit cooperalive-like behaviors {e.g.. food sharing and cooperative hunting) in the wild (see de Waal, 1996) . which make them ideal model species for exploring inhibitory control specifically in the context of social decision-making situations. Unfortunately, however, there remains lo dale litlle consensus ahout the extent to which chimpanzees and capuchins can. like humans, forego their own selfinleresl in the context of social decision making (see reviews in Brosnan. 2(X)6: de Waal. 1996 Waal. , 2008 Silk. 2009 ). Both chimpanzees (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006; Warneken. Hare. Meiis. Hanus. & Tomasello. 2(X)7) and capuchins (Barnes. Martinez.. Langer. Hill. & Santos, 2008; de Waal and Berger, 2000) sometimes behave in costly ways that serve to benefit other individuals. For example, these species will occasionally work to give a human experimenter an out of reach ohiect (Barnes et al.. 2008; Warneken & Tomaselio, 2006; Warneken et al., 2007 Barnes et al. 2008) . To take one relevant example, Jensen. Call. & Tomasello (2007a) presented chimpanzees with a nonverbal Ultimatum Game and found that chimpanzee responders regularly accepted small or nonzero offers, suggesting that chimpanzees are unable to forego their own self interest (see also Jensen. Call. & Tomaseilo, 2007b) . Taken together, the work exploring capuchin and chimpanzee inhibitory control within the context of social decision-making studies also paints a conflicting picture of these species' capacity to forego their own self-interest. Therefore, it remains unclear whether these primate species arc capable of inhibiting their own self-interest in the specific stK'ial decision making contexts in which humans exhibit self-control.
One way to gain more insight into this confusing picture of primates' inhibitory performance is take a mechanistic hint from human neuroimaging work on social decision making. As reviewed above, neuroscientists have observed that one specific neural region-the DLPFC-is critically involved in our capacity to forego selfish payoffs in the context of altruistic games. Therefore, these findings suggest that comparative researchers may want to ftx:u.s specifically on DLPFC-mediated capacities in other primates to gain insight both into the mechanisms underlying primate altruistic behavior and into the evolution of inhibitory capacities more generally. The goal of the present study is to do just this. Specifically, we examine how one model primate species-the brown capuchin-performs on a behavioral test of inhibitory control that has specifically been linked to the function of the DLPFC. a test known as the object retrieval task (sec Diamond 1991a , 1991b : Diamond & Gilbert. 1989 Dias, Robbins. & Robertset. 1996; Santos, Ericson. & Häuser. 1999 ). In the object retrieval task, subjects are presented with the opportunity to retrieve a desired object from inside a small transparent box. The logic behind this task is that subjects must inhibit the prepotent tendency to reach directly for the object to successfully obtain it; rather than reaching straight for the box, the participant must first locate the opening (which is often on the side or top) and reach there instead. The object retrieval task has been used both as behavioral test of inhibitory control in human infants (see reviews in Diamond 1991 Diamond a. 1991 . and as a comparati ve measure of inhibitory control across many primate species (Diamond. 1990 . 1991a , 1991b : Dia.s ct al., 1996 : Santos et al., 1999 . This work has revealed striking differences in performance across different primates species: whereas sotne monkey species naturally perform at mature human levels (e.g.. Diamond. 1990 : Dias et al., 1996 , other species perform at the level of the youngest human infants (Santos et al., 1999) . Indeed, adult tamarins-a species closely related to capuchin monkeys-were only able to succeed on the object retrieval task when they were first trained to retrieve food frt)m an easier, opaque box. Finally, and most importantly for the purpose of this paper, performance on the object retrieval test has been specifically linked to DLPFC function (Diamond 1991a , 1991b : Dias et al., 1996 . Lesions of the DLPFC impede successful performance on the t>bject retrieval task (e.g. . Diamond 1991a . Diamond . 1991b Dias et al., 1996) . and thus the object retrieval task can be considered a behavioral test of the inhibitory processes controlled by neural areas implicated in the Ultimatum Game.
To better explore the inhibitory constraints underlying primates' performance on experimental tests of cooperation, we extended the object retrieval test to the brown capuchin monkey, one of the two species most cumtnonly tested not only in prior studies of inhibitory control, but also in previous studies of cooperation and social decision making. To facilitate the mosi accurate cross-species comparisons, we presented capuchins with a version of the object retrieval test previously used with tamarin monkeys (Santos et al., 1999) . If capuchins are capable of inhibiting their prepotent reaching desires better than other primate species, they would be expected to perform better than tamarin monkeys on an identical version ttf this task. In contrast, if capuchins have only a limited capacity for inhibitory control, then they may perform similarly to tamarins, failing to inhibit the prepotent tendency to reach straight for the reward.
Method
We tested four male (N.N.. F.L., A.G., J.B.) and two female (H.G., J.M.) brown ca-puchin monkeys, ranging in age from 1.5 lo 10 years. Our capuchin participants were members of the capuchin colony at the Yale Comparative Cognition Laboratory. All capuchins were coniniunally housed in a large enclosure equipped wilh loys and natural branches. Monkeys were provisitined with monkey cht>w atier tesiing and had access to water ad libitum. All subjecis had previously participated in experiments concerning object ct)gnition. numerieal representation, and tool use but bad not yet been tested in an object retrieval task.
We conducted our test sessions in a cubical mesh testing cnck>sure (approximately 71 em ) adjacent to the main cage. One enclosure wall, a locking Plexiglas slider, served as a door to the mam cage. At the center of the opposite enclosure wall was an opening (of 3" diameter) through which a subject could manipulate experimental stimuli-Our studies involved an object retrieval box (see Figure 1 ) . a hollow plastic cube (ahout 13 cm x 13 cm x 13 cm) that had five solid sides atid an open side (the position of which changed from trial to trial). We also used a separate box lor the Opaque conditittn that was identical to the iirst box except that it was opaque rather than transparent. We were able to secure each experimental box to a plastic pedestal (15 cm high) to ensure that the box remained posititined in front of the reach-hole during test trials. We also positioned an opaque occluder against the reach-hole to regulate the monkeys" visual and physical access to the box during preparatit>n and set-up. We used grapes, which had been sliced in half so that they would not roll once put into place, as a lood reward throughout all sessions. All triais were videotaped by a Sony Handyeam.
We closely mimicked the pr(x:edure used by Santos et al. (1999) . All monkeys were required to retrieve a piece of fo(xl from inside one of the two Figure I . A diagram olthe set-up. Monkeys were placed inside a lesling box eticlosurc and could reach oui inio ihe box to obiain food. Across ihc session, we varied the location oT ihc opening of ihe hox ("Opening") and the location of ihe marshmallow within the box ("Placeineni") experimental boxes. Before beginning, we randomly classitied our subjects into two test groups: a transparent box testing group (J.B,, H.G., and F.L.) and an opaque bt>x testing group (N.N.. A.G.. and J.M.). Tbe two groups were tested using nearly ibe same procedure, except that the subjects in tbe opaque group were first trained witb an opaque testing box before beginning tbeir experimental trials witb tiic transparent box.
The transparent box testing group began testing witb the transparent box. Eaeh session began when tbe experimenter isolated the monkey inside the testing enclosure. Monkeys received 24 trials in each session, just as in previous studies (e.g.. Diamond & Gilbert, 1989; Santos et al.. 1999) . The experimenter began each trial by placing the occluder over the reach hole. He then placed tbe food inside of the transparent box and tben secured the box onto the plastic pedestal. The experimenter then removed the occluder and the monkey was given 15 s to retrieve the food from inside tbe box. Wben 15 s bad elapsed, or tbe monkey had retrieved the grape, the experimenter replaced the occluder and began set-up for tbe next trial. A correct trial was one in which the monkey was able lo retrieve the reward within tbe first 15 s, wbicb could only be acbieved wben the monkey successfully reached into the opening. Our logic was that subjects would need to quickly revise any incorrect reaching strategies to successfully retrieve food during a 15-s window; any preservative errors sucb as repeatedly reaching for a closed side of tbe box would prevent subjects from obtaining food during tbis sbort window. Trials were initially scored online during testing and tben were recbccked by a ctKJer blind to the hypothesis. Interobserver reliability between tbe online code and the blind coding was extremely high (98%).
As in previous object retrieval studies (Diamond & Gilbert, 1989; Santos et al.. 1999) , the 24 trials within each session varied on the placement of tbe box's opening (front, top, left, right) and tbe position of the grape in the box (partly out, in tbe center, or deep inside). All monkeys received a preset order of these sessions as described in Table 1 ; this preset order was used to best match tbe way that previous object retrieval tests were conducted with other species. As in previous studies, we distinguished between two kinds of trials: more difficult trials in wbicb inhibition was required, which we labeled critical and tbe rest of less difficult trials that we referred to as normal (Santos et al., 1999) . Subjects continued with tbe transparent box until they performed above 90fc on critical trials for two consecutive sessions wilh the transparent trial box.
Tbe opaque box testing group received a task identical to the one presented to the transparent group except that the box used was made of opaque white plastic. As in previous studies, tiionkeys remained on this condition until they ct)mpleted one perfect session of 24 trials witb this opaque box. After reaching this criterion with tbe opaque box. monkeys moved onto subsctjucnt sessions witb tbe transparent box. Subjects eon- Noie. Across ihis set order of trials, we varied the position of the opening and the placement of the marshmallow, resulting in a set order of "normal" and "eritieal" trials.
tinued with the transparent box unli! they performed above 90% on critical trials for two eonsecutive sessions with ihe transparent trial box. Table 2 lists the complete performance for all monkeys (see also Figure 2 ). All monkeys who were given the opaque testing condition performed perfectly on their first session {M = l(K)'/( pcrf((rmance overall). Monkeys trained in this condition went on to perform well on their lirst session of the transparent training {M = 94.08'ii correct on critical trials. !«)'/( on normal trials). Subjects then reached criterion very quickly; two monkeys (J.M. and N.N.) were perfect on their first two sessions, and therefore reached criterion on their first two sessions, whereas A.G. reached criterion on his third session.
Results
In contrast to previous work witb tainarin monkeys (Santos el al.. 1999) , however, capuchins who were trained on the U'anspiirent condition performed as well as tho.se who were first trained in ihe opaque condition (M -9().20% on critical trials. 95.K2'/i on normal trials). Suhjects in the transparent testing condition reached criterion as quickly as thtisc trained in the t>paque testing condition; two monkeys (H.G. and J.B.) reached criterion in their first two sessions, whereas F.L. reachetl criterion on his fifth session. A MannWhitney test confirmed that there was no statistical difference in perlbnnancc between the two groups (Mann-Whitney: Z = 0.2ÍS. p = .83).
To get a better sense of capuchins' performance in this task, we statistically compared capuchins" performance with that of tamarin monkeys tested in ihe transparent and opaque groups (specifically, the data from Experiments I and 2) of Santos et al. (1999) . We performed an ANOVA with species (tamarin {>r capuchin) and testing group (opaque testing group and transparent testing group) as factors. This ANOVA revealed a significant effect of species. f ( l . 10) = 44.004./?< .(KM)I. Tamarin monkeys performed significantly worse on their first day of testing with the transparent box {M = 39% correct) than capuchin iin)nkeys {927c correct). This finding was confirtiicd with nonparametric statistics (Mann-Whitney: Z = 2.49, p < .01). We also observed a significant interaction between of testing group and species (/-(I, 10) -3O..^7, p = .O(X).^). Although tamarins in the opaque testing group periortiied better than tamarins in ihc transparent group, no sucb effect was observed in capuchin nuinkeys. suggesting ihat capuchin performance was basically at ceiling in both testing groups (see also Figure 2 ).
Discussion
The goal of the present paper was to explore the evolution of one cognitive mechanism required for human-liku cooperative behavior, the capacity to inhibit prepotent responses. Our more specific goal was to use a lask specifically linked to DLPFC funclion to explore the nature of inhibitive capacities in brown capuchin monkeys. We chose to explore inhihition in capuchin monkeys specifically because there is currently controversy concerning whether capuchin monkeys are ahle to inhibit the urge to accept small hut unfair payoffs in scKial decision making tasks (see Brosnan & de Waal. 2003; van Woikenten el al.. 2007 . but see Dubreil et al.. 2(X)6; Roma et al.. 2(X)6 for failures to replicate this effect). Rather than require our .subjects to inhibit the desire to accept small payoffs in an inequity lask. we instead used an object retrieval task to investigate whether capuchins could inhibit the prepotent urge to reach directly for a reward when it was inappropriate to do so. Success in this task is knitwn to vary across species and across development, and more importantly is known to depend critically on the maturity of DLPFC. the very cortical area required for rejection of small payoffs in the human Ultimatum Game (Knoeh el al.. 2006; Sanfey et al.. 2003) .
Our results indicate thai capuchins easily inhihit the tendency to reach direclly for food in the object retrieval task, successfully employing an alternative reaching strategy that allows them to achieve flawless retrieval performance. Most of the monkeys tested performed perfectly in their first exposure to the transparent box, and even those who did not perform perfectly performed statistically better than tamarins. This difference in performance is surprising in that these two monkey species are rather closely related. Both tamarins and marmosets, like all New World primates, share a common ancestor that diverged from our own species" lineage approximately 40 million years ago. However, tamarins and capuchins are much closer evolutionarily: they are both members of the same family iCehiciae). indeed, the eommon ancestors of these closely related New Wctrld species diverged into separate into subfamilies only 2.3 million years ago (Fragaszy. Visalberghi, & Fedigan. 2004) .
Despite their phylogenic proximity to previously tested tamarin species, however, capuchins exhibited dramatically greater competence on the object retrieval task than tamarins. In contra.st to tamarins, capuchin monkeys required little exposure with the task to become proficient; capuchins who were first trained with an easier opaque retrieval box performed as well as those capuchins who received no such Iraining. Such cxpîcricnce-independeni performance contrasts greatly with the performance of tamarins, who required extensive training to sueeeed on the task (Santos et al., 1999) .
Our findings therefore build on previous work showing that capuchin monkeys share an assortment of cognitive capacities wiih our own species, bul further demonstrate that capuchins succeed in inhibitory tasks on which other primate species perform poorly. In addition, our observation that capuchins possess robust experience-independent inhibitory capacities in an object retrieval task can help clarify previous work on capuchin inhibitory control in the context of social decision-making tasks. As reviewed earlier, several reports by Brosnan and colleagues suggest that capuchins successfully forego small but unfair payoffs (Brosnan & de Waal. 2003; van Wolkenten et al.. 2007) . Such performance requires capuchins to inhibit the urge to take the unfairly offered allotment of food. Our work suggests that capuchins might be exceptionally well suited among New World monkeys for this type of inequity aversion task. as the present studies indicate that capuchins are easily able to inhibit prepotent responses in nonsoeial contexts, such as the obiect retrieval test.
Perhaps more importantly, however, the present results have important implications for future comparative cognition with this species. Successful inhibitt)ry performance on the object retrieval test is closely linked lo the function of the DLPFC (see Dias et al.. 1996) . Relatively little is known about the neuroanatomieai structure of the DLPFC in capuchins monkeys, although some evidence suggests that this region is likely to be homologous with similar regions in macaque monkeys (Dum & Strick, 2005 ; Leichnit/. & Gon/alo-Rui/. 1996). Nevertheless, our results suggest that capuchin monkeys arc likely to exhibit human-like performance in other inhibitory problems previously linked to the function of the DLPFC. such as the Ultimatum Game and other cooperative trust games. Our monkeys' performance on the object retrieval test demonstrates that capuchins possess at least some of the inhibitive capacities needed to reject unfair offers in an Ultimatum context. The present results therefore suggest that it would be worth testing capuchins on a version of the Ultimatum Game. Our study also paves the way for new studies incorporating other inhibitory control measures (e.g., reversed contingency tasks, etc.) in this species. Therefore, we hope the present results will inspire future work linking studies on the neural basis of human altruism with comparative work on the evolution of primate inhibittiry capacities.
